Andrew Perrin, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Christian Borch, Copenhagen Business School

Angèle Christin, The New School for Social Research

Christian Borch: What use can we make of the classics today? There are different ways of producing interesting sociological theory, and (re-) engaging with classical sociology is clearly not the only one. Indeed, some insist that in order to really create new sociological theory, we need to leave behind the classics. That was the view, for example, of Niklas Luhmann (1995: xlv), who dismissed recourse to classical sociology as a practice of simply “dissecting, criticizing, and recombining already-existing texts” without really rocking the boat. Omar Lizardo (2015: 8) echoed this reasoning in last year’s Lewis Coser Memorial Lecture, where he described “the derivation of creative careful exegesis of the classics” as having been useful in a certain era, but not anymore. I am sympathetic to both arguments, but nevertheless believe that if one is a bit more modest than Luhmann (who wanted to provide sociology with an entirely new theoretical edifice), a return to the classics might not be that misguided.
Of course, there are various ways of reviving the classics for present-day theoretical purposes. Some produce interesting ideas by reinterpreting canonized texts by, say, Weber or Simmel. My own approach is to draw inspiration from the “misfits,” i.e., scholars (or strands of thinking) who are, for various reasons, considered marginal to the discipline. Without pushing the distinction too far, one might say that I am interested in those theories that might well count as “classics” but which were never properly “canonized.” 

J. I. (Hans) Bakker, Brandon University

How can we understand ISIS? What would an Islamic Caliphate look like? I believe it is fruitful to use Max Weber’s theory of traditional authority, particularly patrimonial prebendalism, to answer that question. 

Some current scholars are skeptical of using classical theory by Western scholars to explain contemporary events outside of the West. Raewyn Connell (2007) criticizes much work on globalization as merely what she calls “metropolitan theory.” She critiques the way the history of sociological theory is constructed, especially the use of the classics (Collins 1997), like Comte, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel. She states (p. 64): “A body of writing about the global in which Weber is a major point of reference, but al-Afghani [1968] is not, defines itself as profoundly limited.” There is a grain of truth in her argument but for the most part she is profoundly misleading.

These days you hear the name of Charles Sanders Peirce increasingly often in discussions among sociologists, and it is often in connection with the word “abduction” (e.g. Bertilsson 2009, Swedberg 2014, Tavory and Timmerman 2014). By this term Peirce roughly meant “coming up with new ideas”, something that is absolutely vital for the scientist. More formally Peirce defined abduction as “the kind of reasoning which issues in explanatory hypotheses” (MS 857:4-5).

But there is much more to the work of Peirce than what he has to say about abduction, something that his reputation as a polymath as well as the foremost philosopher in the United States is a reminder of. In this brief article I will discuss one of Peirce’s best-known achievements in philosophy, which is mentioned in every standard work on pragmatism. 

Fiona Rose-Greenland,
University of Chicago